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Credit and interest rate risk in the banking book are the two most important risks faced by 
commercial banks. In this paper we derive a consistent and general framework to measure the 
riskiness of a bank which is subject to correlated interest rate and credit risk. The framework 
accounts for all sources of credit risk, interest rate risk and their combined impact As we model the 
whole balance sheet of a bank the framework not only enables us to assess the impact of credit and 
interest rate risk on the bank’s economic value but also on its future earnings and capital 
adequacy. We apply our framework to a hypothetical bank in normal and stressed conditions. The 
simulation highlights that it is fundamental to measure the impact of correlated interest rate and 
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1  Introduction 
Credit and interest rate risk are the two most important risks faced by commercial banks. But as 
Jarrow and Turnbull (2000) point out ‘economic theory tells us that market and credit risk are 
intrinsically related to each other and not separable’. In this paper we concentrate on the major 
source of market risk for commercial banks: interest rate risk in the banking book. First, we derive a 
general framework to measure the riskiness of banks which are subject to correlated interest rate and 
credit shocks.
1 In line with the current literature this framework incorporates the integrated impact of 
interest rate and the credit risk on banks’ assets. But, we show that it is important to model the whole 
portfolio of a bank: assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items. This not only enables us to assess 
the impact of credit and interest rate risk on risk adjusted discount rates and, hence, banks' economic 
value but also on future expected profits and capital adequacy over time. In the second part of the 
paper, we apply the framework to look at the riskiness of a hypothetical bank in a severe stress 
scenario. And we show that it is fundamental to measure the impact of correlated interest and credit 
risk jointly and on the whole portfolio of banks, including assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet 
items. 
When setting capital or pricing assets the focus is generally on default risk only. For example, the 
Merton (1974) model uses the insights from option pricing to derive the likelihood that the value of 
assets fall below the default threshold and the firm defaults. Similarly, reduced form models in the 
spirit of Jarrow and Turnbull (1996) only model the default intensity. Basel II and commercial credit 
portfolio models such as Moody’s KMV or CreditRisk
+ also account for default risk only
2. A broader 
definition of credit risk includes changes in the value of net assets due to changes in credit spreads, 
downgrades as well as defaults. And all these factors are important when assessing the impact of 
credit risk on the economic value and profitability of a portfolio.  
Interest rate risk is also a broad term and may be attributable to repricing mismatches of assets, 
liabilities and off-balance sheet net positions, including basis and yield curve risk
3. For this reason it 
is important to have a flexible framework to capture the sensitivity of economic value and net 
interest income to changes in the level and slope of the term structure of the risk-free interest rate as 
well as the interactions of interest rate and credit risk.  
Given the complexity of the underlying sources of interest rate risk empirical papers find it hard to 
support its importance for banks’ riskiness. For example, a BIS study by English (2002) concludes 
that it seems unlikely that interest rate changes are an important factor for the stability of a banking 
system, even though English acknowledges that interest rate risk may be an important source of 
volatility of profits. English supports his conclusions by an econometric analysis of annual aggregate 
net interest income in different countries. He only finds weak support that changes in the slope of the 
yield curve as well as long- and short-term interest rates impact on net interest income. In a recent 
study on interest rate risk in the Belgian banking sector, Maes (2005) argues that interest rate risk is 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1 By correlated credit and interest rate risk we do not necessarly imply a linear relationship, but that we model the two 
risks’ dependence. 
2 Unfortunately, these models also assume non-stochastic interest rates and therefore cannot assess the importance of 
interest rate risk on credit exposures.   
3 Interest rate risk also arises from differences in embedded options of assets and liabilities. Even though the framework 
could be extended to capture optionalities we do not consider them in this paper.   3
important for banking stability, but again only finds weak empirical evidence when looking at net 
interest income. 
Banks are aware of the importance of interest rate risk and measure their exposure regularly. They do 
so by undertaking sensitivity tests of parallel shifts or twists in the risk-free yield curve. One of the 
simplest sensitivity tests often undertaken is gap analysis, where banks or regulators assess interest 
rate risk by purely looking at the net repricing mismatch between assets, liabilities and off-balance 
sheet items.
4 Such tests implicitly assume that shocks to the risk-free yield curve have no impact on 
the credit quality of assets. But as pointed out already interest rates risk and credit risk are correlated 
and we show that ignoring the impact of interest rate risk on credit risk can lead to a severe 
underestimation of risk. We will also show why annual net interest income may be too aggregated to 
disentangle the complex effects of interest rates on banks’ riskiness. Following an interest rate 
increase profitability initially falls due to a rise in write offs and a decrease in net interest income as 
margins between short term borrowing and long term lending are compressed. But as the bank 
gradually reprices its assets, net interest income starts to increase because it passes the higher credit 
risk and interest rates to its borrowers. Over time the second effect outweighs the first until the initial 
level of profitability is recovered. Given these opposing effects and combined with other fluctuations 
in the data it is not surprising that an econometric analysis of net interest income using annual data 
finds it hard to support the importance of interest rate risk for banks.  
Jarrow and Turnbull (2000) are among the first to show theoretically how to integrate interest rate 
(among other market risks) and credit risk in a reduced form model. Their insights are backed by 
strong empirical evidence that interest rate changes impacts on the credit quality of assets. For 
example, Jarrow and van Deventer (1998) show that in terms of hedging a bond portfolio, both credit 
and interest rate risk have to be taken into account. Grundke (2005) finds that significant errors are 
made when the correlated nature of rating transitions, credit spreads, interest rates and recoveries is 
ignored. Similarly, interest rates have been identified as the key risk driver of aggregate credit quality 
in the UK (e.g see Benito et al, 2001, and Whitley et al, 2004) 
All these papers look at the integrated impact of credit and interest rate risk on assets only, by for 
example modelling a bond portfolio. However, they do not assess the impact of interest and credit 
risk on liabilities or off-balance sheet items. In a series of papers, Barnhill and various co-authors 
(2000, 2001 and 2004) attempt to measure credit and market risk for the whole portfolio of banks. 
They develop a simulation framework to revalue asset and liabilities depending on the state of 
several systematic risk factors, such as the term structure of risk-free and risky interest rates, stock 
indices and property prices. They integrate interest rate and credit risk for corporates by simulating 
the equity to debt ratio, conditional on systematic risk factors, and map it into different rating classes 
or defaults. Similarly, for loans to individuals they simulate the loan to value (LTV) ratio conditional 
on systematic risk factors and assume that a borrower defaults if the LTV is above a certain 
threshold. All other assets and liabilities are valued at the (conditional) risk-free interest rate. To 
assess the stability of a bank or banking system, they focus on the distribution of the economic value 
                                                                                                                                                                    
4 Generally, gap analysis allocates assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items to time buckets according to their 
repricing characteristics and calculates their net difference for each bucket. Because of this netting procedure, gap 
analysis may fail consider non-linearities and, consequently, underestimate the impact of interest rate risk. For example, 
some short-term customer deposit rates track the risk-free rate plus a negative spread. Hence, for large falls in the risk-
free term structure, banks may not be able to lower deposit rates in line with the risk-free rate because bounded by zero. 
By modelling the whole portfolio we can capture this compression in banks’ net margins.   4
of banks, ie the market value of assets minus liabilities. They find that the credit risk is the most 
significant risk factor for banks. But their conclusion is likely to be misleading as they ignore one of 
the most important source of interest rate risk - repricing mismatches between assets and liabilities
5. 
In contrast to Barnhill et al and most of the literature we not only look at economic value but also at 
future earnings and capital ratios. Volatility of earnings is an important focal point for banks because 
severe falls in profits can pose a threat to banks’ capital and may create liquidity problems, either due 
to a lack of cash or to a downgrade which may lead to funding problems. The measurement of banks’ 
economic value, however, provides a more comprehensive view of the potential long-term exposure 
to credit and interest rate risk.  
Some of the few papers which do take both an economic value and an earnings perspective are Jobst 
and Zeinos (2003) and Jobst et al (2003, 2006). These papers look at optimal portfolio selection in 
the context of dynamic asset and liability management. They simulate correlated interest rates and 
credit spreads, as well as defaults, for a portfolio of corporate bonds and track current and future 
portfolio valuations, incorporating all coupon payments. Using this information they compute the 
optimal portfolio allocation if there is only one investment decision ex-ante or if the portfolio can be 
rebalanced at each point in time. 
We cannot use credit spreads from bond data as we look at banks’ portfolios which contain a wide 
range of non-traded assets and liabilities. Instead, we model corporate and household credit risk 
directly. Further, and more importantly, we model the complex cash flows from liabilities with 
different maturities rather than assuming a simple cash account as Jobst and his co-authors do. Our 
approach also takes account of interest rate sensitive off-balance sheet items.  
The theoretical set-up of our paper is kept very general. In the empirical part we build on a macro 
stress testing model as described in Bunn et al (2005). This model starts with the general assumption 
that conditional on systematic risk factors corporate and household sector defaults are independent. 
And it identifies macroeconomic factors as the key drivers for credit risk. We combine our credit risk 
model with a dynamic yield curve model linking the risk-free yield curve to developments in macro 
factors (Diebold et al, 2006). By linking credit risk and the risk-free yield curve to the same 
systematic risk factors we are able to capture the underlying correlation between credit and interest 
rate risk.  This allows us to assess the impact of credit and interest rate risk on risk adjusted discount 
factors which take account of shifts in the risk-free yield curve as well as the default intensity of 
borrowers. Expanding the single asset framework of Duffie and Singleton (2003) to a portfolio of 
assets and liabilities we can therefore compute the economic value of banks which are subject to 
credit and interest rate risk. But the framework also allows us to project expected profits in future 
periods. In particular, we are able to calculate expected write-offs and expected net interest income, 
the latter by explicitly modelling the repricing of assets and liabilities. Hence, we are also able to 
assess expected earnings, profitability as well as capital ratios conditional on the crystallisation of 
credit and interest rate risk.   
In our simulation we apply our framework to a hypothetical bank which is subject to a combination 
of stress test scenarios similar to those developed for the IMF Financial Stability Assessment 
                                                                                                                                                                    
5 The papers also look at a maturity mismatch of +/- one year and conclude that it is important. But +/- one year is clearly 
too simplistic to capture the full impact of the maturity repricing on the riskiness of banks.   5
Programme of the UK in 2002
6. Even though the stability of the bank is not threatened in the stress 
scenario, we find strong evidence that interest rate and credit risk have to be assessed simultaneously 
as well as jointly for assets and liabilities.  In line with Bunn et al (2005) we show that write-offs 
increase significantly after the stress. But, as we also model net interest income we are able to 
illustrate that the additional margin compression decreases profits even further in the first few 
quarters. But losses are gradually offset once the bank starts to reprice assets and margins reflect the 
change in the risk-free yield curve and credit quality again. The offsetting effect of higher net interest 
income implies that after three years profits are roughly at the same level as in the base line scenario, 
even though write-offs peak only in the third year and are significantly higher than in the base line 
scenario.  
The empirical exercise highlights two important innovations of our framework. First, in contrast to 
standard stress testing models we are able to assess both the economic value as well as the profile of 
the main components of profits during benign and stressed conditions
7. Second, we can decompose 
the change in net profits into changes driven by credit risk, interest rate risk as well as correlated 
credit and interest rate risk. Using our new approach, we show that ignoring the correlations between 
interest rate and credit risk as well as only modelling the asset side of a bank does severely distort the 
risks faced by banks. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss our new general 
framework to integrate credit and interest rate risk in the banking book. In Section 3 we discuss the 
modelling of the term-structure of interest rate of different assets and liability classes. In Section 4 
we present the results of the stress test and in Section 5 we investigate whether interest rate, credit or 
the interaction between both risks is the key risk driver. Our results are evaluated against a number of 
sensitivity tests in Section 6. Finally, we summarise the main conclusions of the paper in Section 7. 
 
2  The framework 
This section starts by discussing the integration of interest rate and credit risk for a generic asset and 
then looks at a bank as a portfolio of several assets and liabilities with different risk and repricing 
characteristics.  
 
2.1  A generic asset 
The economic value of a generic asset i is simply the expected risk-adjusted discounted value of 
future coupon payments C and the principal. For simplicity we assume that all assets are bullet bonds 
– ie repay the principal only at maturity. Given the information set Ω0 the economic value EVA
i,T of 





















T i A D A C D E EVA   (1) 
                                                                                                                                                                    
6 For a detail description of the initial IMF stress tests see Hoggarth and Whitley (2003). 
7 For an overview of stress testing models see Sorge (2005).   6
where D
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and Rt
i the risk adjusted nominal interest rate paid by the generic asset i in period t. 
Before continuing with our theoretical set-up we need to clarify notation. To enhance readability for 
a multi-asset and multi-liability bank we have dropped the expectation operator and will do so for the 
remainder of the paper. But the reader should keep in mind that all our pricing or economic value 
equations are expectations conditional on the information set Ω0. We are also slightly imprecise 
when indicating time periods t-1 to t with just a sub-script t. To clarify: for stock variables, for 
example the economic value of a loan, the subscript t indicates the value of the variable at time t. For 
flow variables, for example a bank’s profits, the subscript t indicates the accrued value of the 
variable between t and t -1.  
In general, the nominal interest rate Rt
i can be decomposed into the risk-free interest rate rt, the credit 
risk premium st
i and a liquidity premium. Such an asset might be a fixed-interest rate bond with no 
embedded options or a simple variable rate bank loan. Abstracting from the liquidity premium, Rt
i 
can be written in continuous time as:  
Rt
i=rt+st







t LGD s ⋅ = λ .
i
t LGD  is the expected loss given default for borrower i at time t and λ
i the 
expected default intensity of borrower i  at time t conditional on  0 Ω .  Duffie and Singleton (2003) 




















t PD  is the expected risk-neutral probability of default of borrower i between t-1 and t 
conditional on surviving until t-1.  
Arbitrage will ensure that at the time of issuance (t=0) the economic value equals the 
face value of the asset. Setting EVA=A in equation (1) and solving for 
T i C
,
0  implies that 



















As economic conditions change, the risk-free interest rate, the PD and LGD of the asset will adjust 
instantaneously.  The discount factor will therefore also adjust immediately. Hence, the asset’s 
economic value will diverge from its face value. However, once the asset can be repriced coupon   7
payments will reflect the new economic conditions and the assets’s economic value will equal its 
face value again.  
2.2  The generic bank 
A bank can be seen as a large portfolio of assets and liabilities
8. In particular, we will look at M 
liability classes Lj and N asset classes Ai where exposures in an asset (liability) class i (j) have the 
same risk characteristics. Within each class individual exposures may have different repricing 
buckets but we assume for simplicity that an asset’s (liability) maturity coincides with its repricing 
characteristics. According to the repricing (T
i) and risk characteristics (PD
i,LGD
i) each asset is 
priced according to formulae 1-5.  In theory these formulae also apply to all liabilities using the 
bank’s own PD and LGD. But as we will discuss shortly we will need to treat liabilities differently to 
match empirical observations.  
To assess the vulnerability of a bank to credit and interest rate risk, we adopt both an economic value 
and an earnings perspective. As discussed earlier, volatility of earnings is an important focal point for 
the stability of a bank in the short run because a fall in income and an increase in write-offs can pose 
a threat to banks’ capital and possibly liquidity. The measurement of the impact of a shock on a 
bank’s economic value provides a more comprehensive view of the potential long-term exposures to 
credit and interest rate risk. Clearly, the earnings and economic value perspectives are related as the 
economic value of a bank should be equivalent to the discounted sum of all future earnings in a risk 
neutral world.  
2.2.1  The economic value perspective 
A firm’s economic value EVB is the economic value of its assets EVA minus the economic value of 
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= = − =
1 1
 (6) 
As already indicated, a key issue in the treatment of banks’ liabilities is the modelling of the banks’ 
own credit risk. One could argue that liabilities should be discounted using the risk-free rate and a 
bank’s PD and LGD. While this seems to be the case for banks’ subordinated liabilities, it is well 
known that shorter-term customer deposit rates are generally below the risk-free interest rate even 
when accounting for non-interest costs net of fees (see for example Maes, 2005). This may be the 
result of deposit insurance schemes or barriers to entry limiting competition
9.  Furthermore, as a 
bank’s credit conditions deteriorate its PD increases and, ceteris paribus, the economic value of its 
deposits decreases. Hence, a deterioration in asset quality will not be fully reflected in the net 
economic value of the bank. In some extreme cases the fall in EVL can more than offset that in EVA 
with the net result of an increase in the bank’s economic value
10. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
8 More generally, a bank’s portfolio also includes off-balance sheet items. In the framework we do not distinguish 
whether assets and liabilities are on- or off-balance sheet items. But we will model them separately in our application in 
the next section.   
9 See Section 3 for a more detailed discussion how we model banks’ liabilities. 
10 For example, consider a bank with a positive net value which has to write-off 10 per cent of its assets due to a sudden 
idiosyncratic adverse shock. And assume that the shock nearly wipes out the bank’s capital. As a consequence, the bank’s   8
Although this may be welcomed by shareholders it is in tension with the concern of depositors, debt-
holders and regulators about the ability of banks to repay liabilities at par when due. Given that one 
of our concerns is to measures banks’ financial strength from the perspective of the overall stability 
of the financial system we are interested in banks’ ability to repay all their liabilities at par when due.   
Hence, our first condition to assess the stability of a bank is to see whether the economic value of 
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1
. Therefore, the economic value perspective is:  
 
Condition 1 – Economic Value:     
  t t FVL EVA >    (7) 
 From a regulatory perspective this condition has two benefits. First, it provides a long term view of 
the bank’s ability to repay all its liabilities when due.  Second, it is also an upper bound in 
comparison to a true marked-to-market analysis as the face value is always greater or equal to the 
market value of liabilities in stressed conditions.  
 
2.2.2  The earnings perspective 
Whereas the economic value perspective provides a long term view based on economic 
fundamentals, the earnings perspective focuses on whether a bank would be sufficiently well 
capitalised in all future states of the world. This is an important difference as a particular path of 
profits may well lead a bank to be undercapitalised in specific periods even though Condition 1 is 
satisfied. This may occur if a bank incurs severe losses in the short run which are outweighed by 
sufficient profits in future periods. From an economic value perspective this bank would be solvent 
but because of market or regulatory constraints it may find it difficult to continue to operate.  For 
example, a bank with a capital adequacy ratio below the minimum requirement could also indicate 
that it might be prone to liquidity runs. 
It is, therefore, important to assess whether a bank’s expected capital adequacy given the expected 
future path of earnings remains above the regulatory minimum k in all periods in the medium term, 
W
11.  Hence our second condition is: 
 
Condition 2 – Capital adequacy  




t < ∀ >  (8)   
where RWA denotes expected risk weighted assets and SF expected shareholders funds, which are 
assumed to be the only capital of the bank.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
PD is likely to increase dramatically, say from 0.01 to 0.5.  If the bank has liabilities with an average maturity of one year 
(and rt and LGD are assumed to be constant at 5% and 50% respectively) such an increase would decrease EVL of 
liabilities by around 19%; well above the 10% loss on the asset side. The net result would be an increase in the bank’s 
economic value.   9
Risk weighted assets are calculated under two different approaches. We first take risk weights to be 
constant over time: 0.5 for inter-bank lending, 0.35 for mortgage lending, 0.75 for unsecured lending 
and 1 for corporate loans in our simulation. This could be seen as an approximation of Basel I 
framework currently in use. Under this approach, risk weighted assets are simply the weighted sum 
of exposures to asset i at time t with risk weights
i w  differing across asset classes. Hence Condition 
2 under this approach is: 
 
Condition 2a – Capital adequacy - constant risk weights 
 







t A w RWA with W t k
RWA
SF
            (9) 
As we are especially interested in severe manifestations of credit risk, the constant-risk-weight 
approach described above may not be suitable as it may underestimate the risks to the capital 
adequacy of the bank. We therefore also use the Basel II internal rating based approach which 
accounts for time-varying risk-weights 
i
t w for different asset classes (see Bank for International 
Settlements, 2004). Hence Condition 2 under this approach becomes: 
 
Condition 2b – Capital - internal rating based approach 
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2.2.2.1 Assessing shareholder funds and future cash flows 
 
Simulating expected shareholders funds SF involves tracking expected net profits which either grow 
by retained earnings (ie profits after taxes and dividend payouts) or decrease by losses in which case 
no taxes and dividends are paid
12. Hence, shareholders fund can be computed as: 
  1 ) ; 0 min( ) ; 0 max( − + + = t t t t SF NP NP SF θ   (11) 
with θ<1 given that the bank pays taxes as well as dividends.  
For a representative bank, expected net profits (NPt ) between period t-1 and t are the sum of net 
interest income plus other income (OIt) minus expected write-offs (WRt) and expected costs (Costt). 
Net interest income in turn is the sum of the expected cash flows the bank receives from its assets 
(CFAti), minus expected cash flows it has to pay on its liabilities CFLtj. 
  t t t t t t Cost OI WR CFL CFA NP − + − − = ) (  (12)   
                                                                                                                                                                    
11 We will only look at Tier 1 capital (proxied by share holders funds) for our simplified bank for which the current 
minimum capital requirement relative to risk weighted assets is 4%. 
12 This equation implicitly assumes that the bank pays dividends proportionally to its income and that the bank is paying 
dividends as long as it is able to do so. Furthermore, it is assumed that losses cannot be carried forward to offset future   10
For simplicity we assume that other income and costs are driven by a constant exogenous process 
calibrated to historical data for an average UK bank. Our approach thus concentrates on simulating 
write-offs and expected net interest income, which is generally the main source of income for 
commercial banks. 
The contribution of a single asset to net interest income is simple to calculate: in the case of no 
default the contribution is C
iA
i, if the borrower defaults the cash flow in that and all future  
periods is 0
13. Furthermore, in the period of default, the bank will write off its losses LGD*A
i
.  
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Even if conceptually the same, deriving CFA for a portfolio can become computationally very 
demanding as all N assets classes have different PDs and LGDs as well as different repricing and 
maturity buckets. In addition, we want to assess expected cash flows not only one period ahead but 
into the medium term. Therefore, we have to make an assumption on the (re-)investment behaviour 
of banks after the assets mature.  
To keep our base line simulation as simple as possible we assume that independent of the initial 
maturity or PD bucket all borrowers have continuing financing needs. Therefore, unless there is a 
default every borrower will roll over her loan with the same maturity bucket as before or, 
equivalently, the bank continues to invest into new projects with the same maturity and risk 
characteristics as the matured assets. This implies that the bank’s portfolio composition changes only 
in line with defaulted assets.  







t A A and LGD PD A A = ⋅ − = − 0 1 ) 1 (  (13) 
and the total expected cash flow between t-1 and t is  
 
 
      (14) 
with  
 Il=1 in period l when assets in bucket b have been repriced the last time prior to t  
 Il=0 otherwise 
The interpretation of equation (14) is relatively straightforward. The first part in brackets sums the 
coupon payments of asset class i which has not been repriced at time t and the second part sums 
coupon payments of asset class i which has been repriced the last time in period l prior to time t.  
Finally, it sums over all asset classes. 
Given the evolution of expected assets, expected future write-offs are given by: 
                                                                                                                                                                    
taxes. However, it is easy to incorporate different tax and dividend regimes in our simulation as we will show in our 
sensitivity analysis.  
13 When calculating net interest income we only consider coupon payments as other cash flows such as the repayment of 
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t A PD LGD WR 1  (15) 
Equation (14) and (15) highlight how profits are driven by changes in write-offs, exposures and cash 
flows contributions to net interest income.  For example, if economic conditions deteriorate expected 
write-offs will increase. Such an increase also decreases
i
t A  and in turn CFA collected between time t 
and t-1, ultimately reducing NPt. On the other hand, the bank also receives higher coupon payments 
from non-defaulted assets which have been repriced to reflect the increase in credit risk and risk-free 
interest rates.   
To estimate expected net profits we also need to forecast the future cash flows that the bank needs to 
pay on its liabilities. As for CFA we have to make an assumption on the re-investment behaviour, 
this time whether depositors are willing to roll over their funds. In line with our previous reasoning 
we assume that depositors are willing to roll over their deposits unless the bank defaults on its 
obligations. Given we assume no strategic defaults, this is only the case if either the earnings or the 
economic value condition is not met. Similar to equation (14), CFL evolves in line with  









































0  (16) 
with: 
 Il=1 in period l when liabilities in bucket b have been repriced the last time prior to t  
 Il=0 otherwise 
 
As for assets, equation (16) sums over all liability classes with the first part in brackets summing the 
coupon payments of liability class j which has not been repriced at time t and the second part 
summing coupon payments of liability class j which has been repriced the last time in period l prior 
to time t.  
Taking equations (13) to (16) allows us to forecast net profits and hence the evolution of 
shareholders funds. The change in shareholders fund, Equation (11), is given by:  
     [ ]
[] ) ( ; 0 min  
) ( ; 0 max
Cost OI WR CFL CFA
Cost OI WR CFL CFA SF
t t t
t t t t
− + − − +
− + − − ⋅ = Δ θ
  (17) 
Whereas shareholder funds change in line with write-offs and income, assets will only vary in line 
with write-offs (see equation 13). To balance the balance sheet we assume that the bank will pay 
back deposits with the free cash flows and in cases where shareholders funds decrease by more than 
write-offs we assume that the bank is able to attract new depositors. Therefore,  
t t t t t SF WR SF A L FVL Δ − − = Δ − Δ = Δ = Δ   (18) 
Our behavioural assumptions are to a certain degree arbitrary. But, we have to restrict ourselves to 
specific investment rules rather than looking at a bank which re-optimises its portfolio in a mean- 
variance sense in each period as this would be beyond the scope of this paper.  
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3  Stress testing credit and interest rate risk for a stylised bank 
The theoretical framework outlined above is flexible enough to accommodate standard credit and 
interest rate risk models as long as different building blocks are mutually consistent. It is essential 
that underlying correlations are captured, for example between PDs of different asset classes and 
between PDs and the risk-free yield curve. A portfolio model based on Jarrow and Turnbull’s (2000) 
would for example fit these requirements. In this paper we use the stress testing model described in 
Bunn et al (2005) amended by the yield curve model of Diebold et al (2006), estimated on UK data 
by Kubelec (2006).  Before turning to the results this section describes the composition of the 
balance sheet of the hypothetical bank and discusses the stress testing and yield curve model in more 
detail.  
3.1  The hypothetical bank  
As an example for this paper we construct a hypothetical bank with a highly stylised balance sheet  
with five asset classes, three liability classes, shareholder’s funds and interest rate swaps as off-
balance sheet items (see Table A1 in the Appendix). We allocate assets, liabilities and off balance-
sheet items into five repricing buckets and we refer to the repricing mismatch between them as 
interest rate sensitivity gaps
14.  
Although our balance sheet is a hypothetical construct, we ensure that the interest rate sensitivity 
gap, shareholder’s funds, profitability (in terms of return on equity and on assets), operating costs 
and the interest rate sensitivity gap roughly matches a UK bank.  
As shown in Table A1 the repricing buckets are not of equal size with respect to the length of time. 
We assume that the frequency of time is quarterly and that the exposure of the bank to an asset in a 
particular repricing bucket is equally split between the number of quarters within the bucket. The 
upper limit of the last repricing bucket is five years and above. To enable us to allocate assets to 
quarterly buckets we assume that the maximum time-to-repricing is ten years and thus divide the last 
time-bucket into 20 quarters between the 5
th and 10
th year to repricing. 
3.2  The risk-free term structure of interest rates  
We look at UK spot interest rates with maturities from 3 months to 10 years extracted from the Bank 
of England yield curve data set
15. The yield curve data are estimated by fitting a spline through 
general collateral REPO rates and conventional government bonds. 
We use the term-structure model by Diebold et al (2006), with three latent factors and three 
observable macroeconomic variables. In vector form, the state-space system of the vector of latent 
and observable variables,  t f , is given by the vector autoregression of order 1: 
t t t f f η μ μ + − Φ = − ) ( 
                                                                                                                                                                    
14 For off-balance sheet items we assume no counterparty risk and therefore model them as risk-free instruments.  
15 See Anderson and Sleath (1999). Data are available from www.bankofengland.co.uk.    13
The three latent factors have the usual interpretation as the level, slope and curvature of the yield 
curve. The vector of yields,  t y , is related to the latent and observable macro factors by 
t t t f y ε + Γ = , 
where Γ contains one free parameter and the yields are assumed only to be affected by the threee 
latent factors. Appropriate zero restrictions are thus imposed on Γ. The transition and measurement 






































whereas Δ is not constraint, Πis diagonal and hence the innovations across yields are assumed to be 
independent. The three observable macroeconomic variables are GDP, inflation and the Bank of 
England base rate
16. The model is estimated on UK data by Kubelec (2006) using monthly data 
between 1986 and 2005.  
The estimated term-structure model enables us to forecast the risk-free yield curves across maturities 
up to ten years conditional on a given macro scenario. Furthermore, the explicit inclusion of macro-
factors captures the underlying risk drivers in the correlation between the risk-free yield curve and 
PDs.  
3.3  Modelling PDs and LGDs for different asset classes 
To capture the interaction between macroeconomic shocks and credit risk we build on a stress testing 
model described in Bunn et al (2005).  It has long been understood that macroeconomic factors are 
important drivers of credit risk (see Duffie and Singleton, 2003). And in contrast to most credit risk 
models, our adopted approach has the benefit that it explicitly models the correlation between the 
systematic risk drivers of credit risk and interest rate risk as macroeconomic factors. This allows us 
to undertake a scenario analysis and simulate the economic value as well as profits for normal and 
highly adverse economic conditions.   
The models for corporate and household sector PDs were original developed by Benito, et al (2001) 
but extended work has been undertaken by Whitley and Windram (2003), Bunn and Young (2004) 
and Whitley et al (2004).   
The corporate probability of default, PNFC PD , is modelled as a function of lagged values of itself, 
changes in the logarithm of GDP ( y Δ ), PNFC income gearing ( PNFC IG ), the change in commercial 
property capital values ( K Δ ), the first difference of the real interest rate ( r Δ ) and net debt of PNFCs 
to nominal GDP (Dy ). Hence the expected corporate default probability is modelled as: 
 ) , , , , , ( , , Dy r K IG y PD PD PNFC k t PNFC t PNFC Δ Δ Δ Ψ = −  (19)   
                                                                                                                                                                    
16 This type of model does not impose the no-arbitrage condition across yields with different maturities (see, for example 
Ang et al, 2006, or Lildholdt et al, 2006). But the model should still be giving a reasonably good forecast of the term 
structure based on a given macro scenario.   14
Similarly the expected probability of default on mortgage loans is modelled as: 
  ) , , , , ( , , LTV H U IG PD PD M k t Mortg t Mortg − Ψ = , (20)   
where ( M IG ) is mortgage income gearing, U is unemployment, H is un-drawn housing equity and 
LTV is the loan to value ratio of first time buyers. Finally, the expected probability of default on 
credit card loans is modelled as: 
 4 ,.., 1 ); , , ( , = Ψ = s CB G SD PD HH s t CC , (21)   
where  s SD  is a seasonal dummy variable taking the value of 1 in quarter s and zero otherwise,  HH IG  
is household income gearing and CB is the number of active credit balances. 
For all types of household and corporate lending, income gearing – a measure of the ease with which 
households and firms can cover debt-servicing obligations – is found to be an important driver of the 
probability of default. Income gearing in turn is highly sensitive to change in interest rates. This 
implies that the interest rate will not only determine the net interest income but is one of the key 
drivers of default risk. GDP and unemployment are additional significant explanatory variables. The 
probability of default on corporate and mortgage loans is also found to be affected by the prices of 
commercial and residential property respectively. 
In our main simulation we assume that the LGD is fixed and not changing from the baseline to the 
stress scenario. But we will assess the impact of changing LGDs in our sensitivity analysis. Slightly 
worse than average industry numbers we assume that the LGD on inter-bank loans is 40%, the LGD 
on mortgage loans to be 30%, the LGD on credit cards to be 80% and the LGD on corporate loans to 
be 60%.  
3.4  Modelling liabilities  
As discussed in the framework section it is well known (Maes, 2005) that shorter-term customer 
deposit rates are generally below the risk-free interest rate. This may be a result of deposit insurance 
schemes, operational costs and barriers to entry limiting competition. But, while an economic 
rationalisation of negative spreads can be found for short maturities it is not convincing for medium 
to long maturities. We assume that as the time-to-repricing increases the interest paid by the bank on 
deposits gradually converges to the risk-free interest rate. We model the deposit rate on households 
deposits with one quarter to repricing to be 2% below the REPO rate and the corporate deposit rate to 
be 1% below the LIBOR rate. The negative spreads are then assumed to decline linearly to be zero in 
the fourth quarter. 
3.5  Forecasting systematic risk factors 
To be able to forecasts PDs and yield curves we need a model that forecasts and captures the 
correlation of systematic risk factors between each other and across time. Rather than using a simple 
macro VAR model which would fit this requirement, we use the Bank of England’s macro model. 
This allows us to use the Bank of England Inflation Report forecasts as baseline scenario.  
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As discussed above it is necessary to consider the stability of the bank in the short and medium as 
well as the long term. We choose the medium term to be three years. For a given macro scenario we 
forecast the dynamics of the macro economy and map theses into PD forecasts over the next three 
years using the estimated equation (19)-(21)
17.  
 
4  Results 
In the this section we measure the impact in the baseline and stress scenario of credit risk, interest 
rate risk and their interaction on the economic value and the profitability of our representative bank 
over a three year horizon. 
4.1  The scenarios 
We follow Bunn et al (2005) and look at the combination of three shocks originally used for the IMF 
‘Financial Stability Assessment Programme’ (FSAP) in 2002: a 12% decline in UK residential and 
commercial property prices, a 1.5% unanticipated increase in UK average earnings growth and a 
15% unanticipated depreciation in the trade weighted sterling exchange rate. Individual scenarios are 
described in Appendix A1. Originally, the magnitudes of the individual shocks have been calibrated 
to extreme events relative to their historical distribution, and combining them begs the question 
about the likelihood of such an event occurring. One could use the historic covariance matrix to 
determine the probability of a combination of these shocks happening. But Bunn et al (2005) do not 
attempt this and approach it as a purely mechanical exercise. Unsurprisingly, the combination of 
shocks has a greater impact than each of the individual shocks alone.   
All our scenarios are run from 2005 Q1 and forecasted over a three year horizon. As base case 
scenario we use the Bank of England February 2005 Inflation Report’s projections where interest 
rates are assumed to follow market expectations. When running the combination of shocks through 
the macro model, we do not apply any judgements and we simply apply the shocks mechanically. As 
will become apparent, and at the heart of this paper, the key macroeconomic variable is the interest 
rate. Hence, modelling the monetary policy reaction to the initial shock is crucial. In line with 
general macro stress testing practices we assume a mechanical Taylor rule.
18  
4.2  Risk-free and credit spread yield curves 
In Figure A1 in the Appendix we compare the evolution of the risk-free yield curves over the next 
three years in the baseline and stress scenario. Whereas in both cases the risk-free yield curve is 
downward sloping, the increase in the level following the stress is evident across all maturities. 
Furthermore, the yield curve flattens in the stress scenario with the short end of the curve around 
                                                                                                                                                                    
17 After the third year we assume that the probability of default of each asset class reverts back to its long run level over 
the following ten years. The quarterly probability of default on corporate loans thus reverts to 0.35%, on mortgage loans 
to 0.70% and on credit cards to 0.61%. These assumptions are not going to be strongly decisive for the results presented 
in the next section. Results of this sensitivity test can be provided by the authors on request. 
18 Under a Taylor rule, interest rates are modelled as a linear combination of deviations of inflation from a target rate and 
output from potential output. This treatment is, of course, not representative of the way in which the Monetary Policy   16
5.5% in the first quarter increasing steadily over the three years reaching almost 10% three years 
after the shock. 
In Figure 1 we show the credit spread curves for mortgages, corporate and credit cards. The solid 
lines represent the spreads after one quarter in the base case and the dashed lines the spreads one 
quarter after the shock (indicated by 1 in Figure A1). As default rates and LGDs on credit cards are 
highest, spreads on credit card lending are much higher than for lending to (secured) households or 
corporates. In the base case spreads on mortgages are in line with average mortgage rates currently 
observed in the market place. Spreads on corporates compare to a BBB spread which is slightly 
above the average quality (BB) of the corporate portfolio of a typical G10 bank (see Catarineu-
Rabell, et al, 2003).  
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The largest increase in spreads in the stress scenario occurs for mortgages. Although the spread on 
credit cards does not rise by as much, it remains higher than that for mortgages. The corporate spread 
is least affected by the macroeconomic shock. The main reason for the subdued rise in the corporate 
spread is consistent with the relatively high credit quality of the banks’ corporate lending book. 
4.3  Condition 1: the economic value perspective 
As postulated in the framework section we adopt an economic value perspective to measure the 
potential long-term impact of the shock on the bank. The economic value of our hypothetical bank in 
the baseline scenario is calibrated to 7.3% of the face value of assets. This equals the book value of 
assets net of liabilities and off-balance sheet items. Immediately after the shock crystallises the 
economic value falls to 5.7% of the face value of assets.  Even though this represents a 21% fall in 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Committee sets interest rates. As has been described by the Bank of England elsewhere, Committee members use a range 
of models and judgements in forming their assessments.   17
economic value, the long-term combined impact of credit and interest-rate risk is not large enough to 
threaten the stability of the hypothetical bank. 
4.4  Condition 2: the earnings perspective 
Given the severe nature of the shocks, it may still be the case that in the short or medium term the 
bank may make losses which could threaten its capital. For this reasons it is important to investigate 
whether Condition 2 is satisfied, ie whether the bank’s expected capital adequacy remains above the 
regulatory minimum in all periods in the medium term. 
As described in the framework section Condition 2 depends, inter alia, on the evolution of net 
profits, shareholders funds and risk weighted assets.  In turn the key two determinants of net profits 
are net interest income and write-offs. In line with Bunn et al (2005) write-offs are significantly 
higher in the stress scenario and peak after around 2 ½ years (dotted lines in Figure 2). This increase 
in credit risk is also reflected in the increasing credit spreads in Figure 1.  
Initially, net interest income falls slightly due to a rise in borrowers defaulting as well as the margin 
compression between short term borrowing and long term lending rates (starred lines in Figure 2) . 
But after 1 year and half net interest income starts to increase above its initial level up to the 12th 
quarter when it fully offsets the higher write-offs and interest rates. The increase in net interest 
income follows the gradual repricing of assets reflecting the higher credit risk in the stress scenario
19.  
 
Figure 2: Evolution of net profits, net 
interest income and write-offs  
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The combined impact of write-offs and net interest income imply that net profits (solid line in Figure 
2) fall by about 50% in the sixth quarter but recover to the base line after 3 years. As we will discuss 
in more detail in the next section, Figure 2 already indicates that interest rate and credit risk have to 
be assessed jointly. For example, focusing on pure default risk by only looking at write-offs leads to   18
an underestimation of risk in the short and an overestimation of risk in the long run. To capture risks 
fully, the initial margin compression and the subsequent repricing has to be taken into account.  
The impact of the shock can also be summarized in terms of return on equity (RoE) (see  Figure 3). 
Compared to a roughly constant RoE of 20% in the base line scenario, the shock halves the bank’s 
RoE in the worst quarter. But it is also evident how the bank remains profitable in every quarter over 
the three-year horizon. As profits after tax and dividends are retained as capital, shareholders funds 
increase in each quarter. And given that under the standardised approach risk weights do not adjust to 
the decrease in credit quality, Condition 2a improves in both scenarios as shown in Figure 4, Panel 
A.  
Conversely, under the internal approach the increase in shareholders funds is more than offset by the 
increase in risk weights reflecting the rise in credit risk (Figure 4, Panel B). However, the overall fall 
does not threaten the stability of the bank as the capital ratio always remains well above the 
regulatory minimum. As well as Condition 2a, Condition 2b is therefore satisfied in all periods. 
Overall, we can conclude that independently of whether we look at the short or long run indicators 
developed in this paper, the shock would weaken our hypothetical bank but it would not threaten its 
stability.  
 
Figure 4: Shareholder funds as a proportion of risk-weighted assets – Condition 2 
Panel A:  
Condition 2a: Constant-risk-weight approach   
Panel B:  

































5  Integration of interest and credit risk 
 
Given interest rate and credit risk are intrinsically related, this section investigates which risk is the 
main driver of the fall in profits in the stress scenario. For this analysis we break down the impact 
into three components: 
                                                                                                                                                                    
19 Note that we are assuming that the bank can fully translate the increase in PDs into the premia it charges on borrowers, 
and that such a rise in premia does not affect write-offs and arrears.   19
A.  The impact of the shock due to credit risk from non-interest rate factors. 
B.  The impact of the shock due to interest rate risk but excluding the effect of changes in 
interest rates on credit risk. 
C.  The impact of the interaction of credit risk and interest rate risk. 
To assess (A) we calculate PDs conditional on all systematic risk factors changing to their stressed 
levels but interest rates remaining as in the base case scenario
20. Hence, (A) highlights the 
importance of all non-direct interest rate factors. (B) is similar to interest sensitivity analysis run by 
banks on the whole portfolio. These tests look at shifts (often only parallel ones) in the yield curve 
but ignore any implications this may have on credit risk. (C) is calculated as the difference between 
the impact of the overall shock, as described in the previous section, and the combined impact of (A) 
and (B). 
Figure 5 shows that in comparison to other macroeconomic factors interest rates are the key driver of 
the rise in credit risk in our scenario. Figure 6 disentangles the complex effects of interest rate and 
credit risk on net interest income. As gap-analysis suggests ‘pure interest rate risk’ decreases net 
interest income as margins are compressed. However, ‘pure interest rate risk’ does not take account 
of the impact of interest rates on credit quality nor the correlation of interest rates and other credit 
risk drivers in a stressed scenario. The increase in credit risk has two effects on net interest income. 
First, higher write-offs decrease net interest income as the bank’s exposures decline over time. But 
second, this effect is outweighed by the positive impact of credit risk on net interest income because, 
over time, banks adjust the credit spread on loans that are repriced.
21 
Looking at the overall impact on profits (Figure 7) it is evident that the rise in interest rates is the 
main driver of the fall in net profits reflecting the combined effect of the squeeze in net margins and 
the rise in write-offs caused by the change in interest rates. Hence, the combined impact of correlated 
credit and interest-rate risk is the key determinant of the banks risk profile.  
This discussion highlights why risks have to be assessed jointly. For example, a simple gap analysis 
is not sufficient for risk assessment as this only looks at the striped area in Figure 6 ignoring all other 
effects on net profits. Similarly, focusing on credit quality only, for example by projecting expected 
write-offs, is also misleading. Such an analysis does not account for the initial fall and subsequent 
increase in net interest income as shown in Figure 6.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
20 This calculation does not account for interactions between interest rates and macro factors.  
21 Even though net interest income falls in the first quarter due to some loans defaulting this effect is negligible. But the 
small impact on net interest income in this quarter is driven by our assumption that the shortest repricing maturity is 3 
months across all asset and liability classes. Shorter maturities such as overnight bank deposits would only lead to a 
bigger decrease in net-interest income in the first quarter but would not change the remainder of the analysis.    20
 






















(a) The scale is inverted to visually enable the adding of write-offs and net interest income  
 
















































   21
6  Sensitivity analysis 
In this section we analyse the sensitivity of the results to some of our main assumptions and to 
changes in the characteristics of the hypothetical bank balance sheet. 
6.1  Cyclical  LGD 
A recent book edited by Altman et al (2005) provides strong evidence that macroeconomic variables 
have an important effect on LGD and that recovery rates are low when aggregate default rates are 
high. For example, Schuermann (2005) finds that recovery rates are one-third lower in recessions.  
Frye (2003) corroborates this evidence by showing that the LGD in high default years exceeds LGD 
in low default years by around 15 percentage points.
  
Even though we start with relatively high LGDs in the main section we assume that they are fixed 
and not changing in the stress scenario. We test the sensitivity of our results by decreasing recovery 
rates by 1/3 as suggested by Schuermann
22.  As it is unrealistic that LGDs remain at the high level 
forever we assume that LGDs gradually revert to baseline LGDs over the following 10 years, 
consistent with our PD assumptions. 
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Interestingly, the additional impact of higher LGDs implies only a further four percentage point 
decline in economic value from 21% to 25%. The LGD assumption does also not have any material 
impact on shareholder funds as a proportion of RWA under the constant-risk-weights approach. 
However, under the internal rating based approach the capital ratio falls to a minimum of 4.2% in the 
eighth quarter versus a minimum 5.8% with constant LGD in the same quarter. This fall is mainly 
driven by the rise in risk weights and the fall in net profits (Figure 8).  It is also worth noting that the 
rising LGDs lead to a substantial increase in the impact of credit risk from non-interest factors in 
                                                                                                                                                                    
22 Using a 15 percentage point increase of LGD as suggest by Frey generates results which are slightly less severe than 
using Schuermann’s assumption.   22
particularly in the first quarter. The rise in LGDs also augments the negative impact of the interaction 
between credit and interest-rate risk between the second and the eighth quarter and that of pure credit 
risk in the first six quarters. 
 
6.2  A rise in the customer funding  
In recent years major banks have seen their annual growth rate in lending to non-bank customers 
outpace the corresponding growth in deposits from this sector at an aggregate UK level. This has 
created a so called customer-funding-gap (CFG), ie the stock of lending to customers exceeds the 
stock of customer deposits (see Bank of England, 2005). We simulate a rise in the CFG for our 
hypothetical bank by decreasing customer deposits in the first repricing bucket by 20% and 
increasing deposits from banks by the same amount. 
Both in the baseline and stress scenario the rise in CFG has the same negative impact (Figure 10) and 
is entirely driven by a decrease in net interest income. As the bank has to pay a higher interest rate on 
interbank deposits compare to household deposits, the increase in the CFG only lowers the net 
interest margin without affecting the banks interest rate sensitivity gap or its exposure to credit risk.  
 
Figure 10: Net interest income and return on equity with rise in customer-funding-gap 
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6.3  High interest rate sensitivity gap  
While in the UK the majority of mortgages carries variable rate, this is not the case in many other 
countries where banks have a higher proportion of fixed-interest rate mortgages. A bank with a 
relatively higher proportion of variable mortgage loans can reprice the mortgage loans more quickly 
in response to increased credit risk and changes in the risk-free interest rate. Therefore, a bank 
holding a relatively higher proportion of variable rate mortgages should, ceteris paribus, be less 
affected by changes in risk-free interest rates than a bank with more fixed mortgages.   23
To illustrate this point we arbitrarily increase the proportion of fixed mortgages in our hypothetical 
bank from 24% to 65% and keep the amount of its off-balance sheet items constant. We assume that 
the proportion of fixed rate mortgages in the repricing bucket from 6-12 months is 20%, from 1-5 
years 35% and above 5 years 45%. As a result this bank has a much larger negative interest-rate 
sensitivity gap (IRSG) in the first repricing bucket.  
This is somehow a counterfactual analysis as it is likely that a bank with predominantly fixed rate 
mortgages would offset the higher interest rate risk by increasing the use of off-balance sheet items. 
But we undertake this simulation as an example to highlight the importance of the initial interest rate 
sensitivity gap.  
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In Figure 11 we compare the results from our original bank with the bank with the higher IRSG. 
The figure clearly illustrates the difference between a high and low IRSG as net profits of the high 
IRSG bank decrease much further. This reflects the substantial fall in net interest income as the high 
IRSG bank is not able to reprice the mortgage loans to reflect the shift in the risk-free term structure 
and the increasing credit risk. The lower profitability of the bank with the higher IRSG is also 
evident when looking at RoE. It falls dramatically and even becomes negative in the sixth and eighth 
quarter following the stress. Subsequently it recovers gradually as mortgages in the longer repricing 
buckets are repriced. But given that a large proportion of mortgages is allocated to the greater than 
five year repricing bucket, RoE is still well below its level in the base case at the end of the third 
year.  
Because of the negative RoE, it is important to ascertain that both Condition 1 and Condition 2 are 
still satisfied. Although the fall in the banks’ economic value increases to 31%, it remains well above 
zero.
23 Moving to Condition 2, under the internal approach the ratio of shareholders funds to risk 
                                                                                                                                                                    
23 The fall in economic value in the main section was 21 %.    24
weighted assets falls to a minimum of 5.44% in the 9
th quarter which is also well above the 
regulatory minimum. Hence, the financial stability of the bank is not seriously threatened even 
though our hypothetical bank has several quarters with negative RoE. 
 
6.4  Constant spread on variable rate mortgage loans 
In the main section we assumed that the maturity of assets and liabilities coincide with the time to 
repricing. This implies that every contract can be rewritten every time a loan is repriced. Hence the 
bank can change the lending rate on variable rate mortgages reflecting both the changes in the risk-
free interest rate and the change in credit risk. If, more realistically, the time-to-maturity is longer 
than the time-to repricing it is not clear whether banks can modify the credit spread on variable rate 
mortgages whenever the loans are repriced.  
 
To analyze how sensitive our results are to such an assumption we consider the opposite case. We 
assume that the bank must hold a constant spread on the variable rate mortgages for atleast the first 
three years (this is equivalent to assume that no variable mortgage matures within three years). In 
Figures 12 and 13 we illustrate how this impacts our results. 
  
Figure 12: Return on equity and net interest income with constant credit spread on variable 
mortgages 
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First, from Panel A it is clear that, in the stress scenario, the offsetting impact of pure and integrated 
credit risk via the rise in credit spreads (dotted line) is much smaller than that in the main section 
(continuous line). Hence, net interest income is substantially lower as a result of the bank not being 
able to price the additional credit risk in the loan.  
The consequence is a RoE that falls more sharply, and for a longer time, following the stress as 
shown in Panel B.    25
6.5  Different levels of payout by the bank 
So far we assumed that the variable θ, determined by the tax rate and the pay-out ratio, does not 
change over time. While it may be reasonable to assume that the tax rate remains constant, a constant 
pay-out ratio is less convincing as this would imply that dividends are perfectly flexible. Indeed, 
stickiness in dividends is both empirically documented (Allen and Welch, 2000 or Benito et al, 
2002) and theoretically explained by the asymmetric response of equity prices to bad and good news 
(Glosten et al, 1993, Nelson, 1991, or Bekaeart and Wu, 2000) and on the basis of Corporate 
Finance’s information-signalling theory (Howe et al, 1992, DeAngelo, 2000).  
Figure 13 shows the impact on capital adequacy if the bank keeps its dividends at a constant level. In 
comparison to fully flexible dividends, the bank’s capital ratio falls under both the constant-risk-
weight and internal approach. This is driven by a pay-out ratio which is greater than one in most 
quarters. Hence, the bank has to use some of its capital to pay dividends. However, capital adequacy 
still remains above the regulatory minimum in all periods. Furthermore, if we constrain the pay-out 
ratio not to be above one, the fall in the bank’s capital ratio in Panel B is much less evident.  
 
Figure 13: Shareholder funds as a proportion of risk-weighted assets under a fixed 
dividend policy 
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7  Conclusion 
Credit and interest rate risk are the two most important risks faced by commercial banks. And given 
that they are correlated, they cannot be measured separately. Surprisingly, most studies focus on the 
correlation between interest rate risk and default risk of assets. But a bank’s profitability and net 
worth depend not only on the default risk, but also on the overall credit quality of its assets as well as 
its liabilities and off balance sheet items. This paper proposes a general framework to compute a 
bank’s economic value as well as its future profitability and capital adequacy over time by assessing 
the impact of correlated credit and interest rate risk on risk-adjusted discount rates and cash flows 
contributions to earnings. 
In the second part of our paper we apply our framework to evaluate the impact of a severe stress on 
the economic value and capital adequacy of a hypothetical bank. To capture the correlated impact of 
credit and interest rates we employ a simple stress testing model linking macroeconomic factors to 
the risk-free yield curve and PDs of companies and households to common macroeconomic factors.  
Although the stability of our hypothetical bank is not threatened in the stress scenario, we find that it 
is fundamental to assess the impact of interest rate and credit risk jointly on assets, liabilities and off-
balance sheet items. We show that a simple gap analysis will underestimate the risks to banks. Even 
though it captures the initial repricing miss-match it will not account for the strong negative impact 
of interest rates on the credit quality of assets. But purely focusing on credit quality, for example by 
projecting expected write-offs, is also misleading. Such an analysis does not account for the increase 
in net interest margins in the medium run which reflect the increase in interest rates and the 
deterioration in credit quality once banks can reprice their assets.  
The qualitative results of our paper are stable across a whole range of sensitivity test. However, we 
show that the cyclicality of LGDs and the ability of a bank to raise credit spreads can matter. 
Similarly, the composition of the bank’s balance sheet in terms of riskiness and repricing mismatch 
is crucial for assessing the overall riskiness of a bank.  
The essence of our framework lies in a relatively simple, but at the same time, holistic approach: to 
assess the riskiness of banks’ portfolios as we focus on risk-adjusted discounting and future 
profitability. Given its generality, we think it represents an important step forward from the current 
literature.  
Obviously the implementation of the framework relies on a particular risk-free term structure and 
credit risk model. These are key inputs to measure the riskiness of a bank. And we stress that it is 
important to use consistent models, which capture the correlation between yield curves and credit 
risk by explicitly modelling the underlying systematic risk drivers. We think that this is an area 
where it may be interesting to undertake more future work. First, it could be useful to look at more 
disaggregated and sophisticated credit risk models such as for example the models of corporate 
default proposed by Drehmann et al (2006) and the household model proposed by May and Tudela 
(2005). Second, it would be interesting to explore the sensitivity of LGD to systematic risk factors in 
greater depth. Even though the literature is expanding in this area, data limitations on recovery rates, 
especially for UK bank loans, could be a potential obstacle. Finally, in this paper we measure 
expected losses only, whereas it would be useful to generate the full loss distribution during periods 
of stress. Although we expect that these extensions will refine the exact estimation on the importance   27
of credit versus interest rate risk, we think that they will not alter the main message of this paper: for 
a complete risk assessment it is fundamental to measure the impact of correlated interest and credit 
risk jointly and on the whole portfolio of banks.    28
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Appendix 
 
A1: Stress scenarios 
 
A)  Decline of 12% in residential and commercial property prices.  This scenario is assumed 
to result from a general drop in demand for the flow of property services.  Since housing 
accounts for one half of households’ net worth, the personal sector’s balance sheet 
deteriorates and household consumption is reduced.  Output is lower than otherwise but the 
adverse effect is a little smaller than under the first scenario.  
B)  1.5 percentage point unanticipated increase in average earnings growth (reflecting a step 
increase in real reservation wages).  This supply shock boosts personal incomes and 
consumption but the transmission to higher inflationary pressure induces a rise in official 
interest rates under the Taylor rule.  Overall there is a marginal decline in GDP compared 
with the base case.   
C)  A 15% (initial) unanticipated depreciation in the trade-weighted sterling exchange rate.  
This scenario entails a fall in the demand for sterling owing to an increase in the perceived 
relative riskiness of sterling assets (in other words, a rise in the sterling risk premium).  
Sterling depreciation results in higher inflation and, in response, nominal interest rates 
increase under the Taylor rule.  Nonetheless, since wages and prices adjust only gradually, 
there is a temporary depreciation in the real exchange rate which in turn boosts net export 
volumes.   
In addition, the IMF FSAP also considered a shock the world equity prices due to a 
downward revision in corporate earnings, which we do not include in our exercise as the 
Taylor rule implies a monetary policy reaction offsetting some of the consequences of the 
initial shock.  
   32
A2: Additional tables and graphs 
 
Table A1: balance sheet of the hypothetical bank 
Assets
Total loans and advances to banks 5,500 1,900 500 100 100 0 8,100
Total loans and advances to customers 86,900 12,200 5,000 17,800 12,300 0 134,200
Total Households 44,700 10,600 2,400 10,600 5,600 0 73,900
Mortgage 24,600 9,800 1,200 7,200 2,400 0 45,200
Fixed Rate Mortgages 0 0 1,200 7,200 2,400 0 10,800
Variable Rate Mortgages 24,600 9,800 0 0 0 0 34,400
Credit Cards+Credit Cards 20,100 800 1,200 3,400 3,200 0 28,700
Total PNFCs/NPISH 42,200 1,600 2,600 7,200 6,700 0 60,300
Treasury bills and other debt securities 6,700 2,300 2,100 3,400 3,200 0 17,700
Total assets 99,100 16,400 7,600 21,300 15,600 0 160,000
Liabilities
Total deposits by banks 32,300 1,600 600 100 300 0 34,900
Total deposits to customer accounts 98,000 3,400 4,300 4,300 300 6,000 116,300
Total Households 49,000 1,700 2,150 2,150 150 3,000
Total PNFCs/NPISH 49,000 1,700 2,150 2,150 150 3,000
Shareholders funds - equity 8,800 8,800
Total liabilities (excl shareholder funds) 130,300 5,000 4,900 4,400 600 6,000 151,200
Total liabilities 130,300 5,000 4,900 4,400 600 14,800 160,000
Off-balance sheet items  13,600 -9,800 -1,100 -2,500 2,600 2,800
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Figure A1: Evolution of the risk-free term structure over the next 12 quarters in the base and 
stress scenario respectively 
























































    